TY  - BOOK
AU  - Felsenthal,Dan S.
AU  - Nurmi,Hannu
ED  - SpringerLink (Online service)
TI  - Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
T2  - SpringerBriefs in Economics,
SN  - 9783319510613
AV  - JA77 
U1  - 338.9 23
PY  - 2017///
CY  - Cham
PB  - Springer International Publishing, Imprint: Springer
KW  - Political economy
KW  - Welfare economics
KW  - Economic theory
KW  - Political philosophy
KW  - International Political Economy
KW  - Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy
KW  - Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
KW  - Political Philosophy
N1  - Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed -- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates -- Practical Significance and Open Problems; Available to subscribing member institutions only. Доступно лише організаціям членам підписки
N2  - This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3
ER  -