Section 1 Value of Information Sharing -- Modeling and Measuring the Bullwhip Effect -- Empirical Studies in Information Sharing -- Collaborative Forecasting in Retail Supply Chains -- Section 2 Contracting and Information -- Reliability or Inventory? An Analysis of Performance-Based Contracts for Product Support Services -- Project Contracting Strategies for Managing Team Dynamics -- Time-Related Incentive Contracts for Managing Projects with Uncertain Completion Time -- Contracting for New Product Development -- Supply Disruptions and Procurement Contracting -- Contracting for Information Acquisition -- Section 3 Information Signaling and Cheap Talk -- A Tale of Two Information Asymmetries in Competitive Supply Chains -- Supply Chain Information Signaling and Capital Market -- Buying from the Babbling Retailer? The Impact of Availability Information on Customer Behavior -- Incentives for Forecast Information Sharing under Simple Pricing Mechanisms -- Section 4 Incentives for Information Sharing -- Establishing Trust and Trustworthiness for Supply Chain Information Sharing -- Information Leakage in Supply Chains -- Bilateral Information Sharing and Pricing Incentives in a Retail Channel -- Sharing Demand Information under Simple Wholesale Pricing.

Sharing accurate and timely supply and demand information throughout a supply chain can yield significant performance improvements to all members of the supply chain. Despite the benefits, many firms are reluctant to share information with their supply chain partners due to an unequal distribution of risks, costs, and benefits among the partners. Thus, incentive mechanisms must be in place to induce communication, cooperation, and collaboration among all members of a supply chain. The issue of information exchange/sharing has been examined by various researchers over the last 15-20 years. However, there is no research book that compiles various approaches, analyses, key implications, as well as future development of this area. This book will serve as a handbook for researchers who are interested in learning the state of the art of the line of research in this area and explore open research topics in this area. Chapter authors, all leading researchers, have contributed 18 chapters broken into four distinct sections covering the Value of Information Sharing, Contracting and Information, Information Signaling, and Incentives for Information Sharing.

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