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020 _a9789401592253
_9978-94-015-9225-3
024 7 _a10.1007/978-94-015-9225-3
_2doi
050 4 _aB53
072 7 _aHPM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI015000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aQDTM
_2thema
082 0 4 _a128.2
_223
100 1 _aVollmer, F.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 0 _aAgent Causality
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby F. Vollmer.
250 _a1st ed. 1999.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c1999.
300 _aVII, 168 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,
_x0166-6991 ;
_v283
505 0 _a1. Problems with the Common Sense Theory of Action -- 2. Frankfurt’s Solution -- 3. Theories of Agent Causality -- 4. Persons -- 5. Reflective Consciousness -- 6. Empirical Research -- 7. The Epi-Phenomenalist Problem -- 8. Is The Self a Social Construction? -- 9. Darkness, Madness and Childhood -- 10. Overall Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Name Index.
520 _aWe act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions are done by us, not elicited by reasons. The present essay is an attempt to understand this concept of agent causality. Who -~ or what - is an agent ? And how - in virtue of what - does an agent do things, or refrain from doing them? The first chapter deals with problems in the theory of action that seem to require the assumption that actions are controlled by agents. Chapters two and three then review and discuss theories of agent cau­ sality. Chapters four and five make up the central parts of the essay in which my own solution is put forth, and chapter six presents some data that seem to support this view. Chapter seven discusses how the theory can be reconciled with neuro-physiological facts. And in the last two chapters the theory is confronted with conflicting viewpoints and phe­ nomena. Daniel Robinson and Richard Swinburne took time to read parts of the manuscript in draft form. Though they disagree with my main viewpoints on the nature of the self, their conunents were very helpful. I hereby thank them both.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aPhilosophy.
650 0 _aLanguage and languages—Philosophy.
650 0 _aPhilosophy and science.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Man.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E28000
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Language.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E26000
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789048152728
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780792358480
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789401592260
830 0 _aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,
_x0166-6991 ;
_v283
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9225-3
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
912 _aZDB-2-BAE
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